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Introduction 
On 11 October 2012, the City of Oslo arranged an election of representatives to the Council of 
immigrant organisations (CIO). Members from 164 local immigrant organisations in Oslo 
were eligible to elect ten representatives for the period from 2013 to 2016. The members of 
CIO were elected as representatives of the region where most members of the organisations 
have their background. The City administration has defined five regions. Latin America has 
one representative, while the other four regions - Africa; Asia east of Iran; Iran and the 
Middle East; and Europe, Turkey and Afghanistan - each have two representatives. In 
addition to this regional representation, CIO has one representative from the immigrant youth 
organisations. The City of Oslo also requires CIO to have at least 40 per cent representation 
from each gender (EMI 2012a). 
The City of Oslo sets up CIO and defines it as an important political instrument in the 
City’s integration of immigrant-origin minorities. While the City of Oslo has prescribed this 
detailed design of the election of CIO members, the leader is appointed by the City of Oslo. 
The municipality has given CIO the mandate to represent immigrant organisations in the 
preparation and implementation of political decisions in Oslo. CIO is obliged both to provide 
a common platform for the work done by the immigrant organisations in the city and to be a 
consultative body for local authorities. With this institutional design CIO has a double 
mandate, one from the City of Oslo and one from its electorate.  
The question I raise in this article is how the City of Oslo’s design of the Council of 
immigrant organisations in Oslo has an impact on its form of representation, its activities and 
its political position within the local government.  
One way to assess the impact of institutional design is based on how a design 
contributes to substantive outcomes in specific situations (Goodin 1996). Institutions are 
designed to produce a certain outcome, and assessed instrumentally on the basis of their 
contribution to substantive results. Some institutions should, however, also be analysed on the 
basis of whether the institutional design is seen as the appropriate way of coping with certain 
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challenges (Olsen 1997:220). Accordingly, an institution’s legitimacy is linked to properties 
of institutional design. One example is how support for representative institutions is a 
commitment to a long-term institutional design, and not to a specific outcome (Pitkin 1967). I 
apply these two approaches to institutional design with the aim of analysing the impact of 
how CIO has been designed both as a council incorporated in the City’s integration policy and 
as a representative institution. 
A growing number of cities in both Western Europe and North America are setting up 
immigrant councils and other institutional structures to integrate immigrants (Gsir and 
Martiniello 2004; Guentner and Stanton 2013). This makes it crucial to know what kind of 
institutional design works, and what kind of difficulties there might be. Moreover, research on 
representation by immigrant-origin and ethnic minorities in Europe remains at an early stage. 
As Bloemraad and Schönwälder (2013: 567) argue, immigrants' and ethnic minorities’ extra-
parliamentary and informal participation, with the exception of immigrant organisations, is an 
almost unresearched territory in Europe.  
This analysis of CIO will be seen in the context of the immigrant population and 
political representation in Oslo. In 2014, the population in Oslo consists of 624 000 persons, 
of which 189 000 are immigrants or children of immigrants. This equates to around 30 per 
cent of the population. The comparable number in Norway is around 14 per cent. Two years 
before CIO was established, in 1983, the population in Oslo amounted to 449 000 persons, of 
which 26 000 were immigrants or children of immigrants (NOU 1985: 29). Over the past 30 
years, there has not only been an increase in the immigrant population, but also a change in 
the right of foreign citizens to take part in local elections in Oslo/Norway. 
Since this right was introduced in 1983, there has also been a gradual increase in the 
number of representatives in the local parliament of persons with an immigrant background. 
After the 2007 election 17 per cent of the representatives had an immigrant background, and 
at that time this group accounted for 23 per cent of the population. The election result in 2011 
was such that 27 per cent of the representatives had immigrant backgrounds. The same year, 
persons with an immigrant background constituted 28 per cent of the city. This direct political 
representation of immigrant-origin minorities in the local parliament is crucial for the 
legitimacy of how CIO is designed to compensate for the immigrant-origin minorities' lack of 
political participation in Oslo.  
The article is divided into four parts. The first part presents the methodology. The 
second part discusses theoretical contributions to institutional design and political 
representation with the aim of developing theoretical tools that are useful for the empirical 
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analysis. The third part presents the formal features of CIO’s institutional design and 
discusses some consequences of its form of representation. The fourth part analyses how CIO 
has used its role as a representative when it performed its activities. The fifth part examines 
CIO’s political position within the local government. 
 
Methodology 
The empirical analysis concentrates on the period from the immigrant organisations elected 
members of CIO in Autumn 2008 until the new members started their work in Spring 2013. 
The reason for examining four years of CIO’s 28 years of existence is the access to empirical 
material about CIO’s activities. The way I have followed CIO closely over these years would 
not have been possible in previous years. Moreover, these four years cover one electoral 
period for the elected CIO members. In this period, CIO had its first leader with an immigrant 
background, while previous leaders were of ethnic Norwegian background. The leader plays a 
central role in CIO’s activities. In the selected period, he was also a leader of the Organisation 
against Public Discrimination, which is a national institution working for gender equality, 
integration and equal public services for ethnic minorities in Norway. Due to his central 
position, an analysis of CIO’s activities would probably have been different if I had studied 
another period of CIO’s history. By concentrating on this election period, I can analyse what 
opportunities CIO’s institutional design allows for, and how some members and the leader of 
CIO used these opportunities. 
The evidence is based on documents from CIO’s archives, such as minutes from 
meetings, correspondence, CIO’s presentation of its own work, newspaper articles, pamphlets 
from campaigns, web pages and CIO’s consultations with political authorities. I worked with 
these archives in summer 2012, receiving helpful advice from CIO’s secretary. I have 
conducted four formal interviews; with the leader, secretary and one member of CIO, and 
with two civil servants from the City administration who work regularly with CIO. All quotes 
are based on my formal interviews. I have also had around ten informal conversations with 
each of these informants at meetings and seminars. I have followed CIO’s work by attending 
both its internal meetings and its formal meetings with local and national politicians from 
Spring 2011 to Autumn 2012. 
I have used three approaches to analyse CIO’s activities, which are all based on a 
combination of studies of documents from CIO’s archives, interviews and attendance of 
meetings and seminars. Firstly, I have examined CIO’s internal meetings and contact with 
local immigrant organisations in the city. Secondly, I have studied CIO’s external activities 
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such as public campaigns, appearance in the media and collaboration with other civil society 
actors. Finally, I have investigated CIO’s relations with political authorities, such as its formal 
meetings with the city administration and how it functions as a consultative body within the 
City’s political processes. 
While this article’s main focus is on CIO’s activities, the immigrant organisations it 
represents are also included with the aim of comparing their interests and values with CIO’s 
activities. I have examined how the organisations define their main purpose in statutes of 133 
of the 164 immigrant organisations that took part in the election of CIO. The remaining 31 
statutes were not available from the local authorities, and according to the local authorities, 
they probably  no longer exist  (EMI 2012b). Moreover, I have examined what kind of 
activities the immigrant organisations receive financial support for from the authorities to 
carry out. This empirical work gives me an overview of the immigrant organisations' interests 
and values, which CIO acts on behalf of. 
 
Institutional Design and Representation 
The way institutions are understood in this article, they have a partly autonomous role in 
political life. Institutions are markers of a polity’s character, history and visions and it makes 
a difference how they are organised (March and Olsen 1995). The idea that political actors 
design and redesign institutions to achieve certain goals is seen in light of the fact that 
political actors often have several and often inconsistent purposes and only a limited 
understanding of the situation (Olsen 2007: 11). Institutional design and redesign can be the 
outcome of processes involving competing interests and values. 
 As mentioned in the introduction, one can distinguish between at least two approaches 
to assess the impact of institutional design (Olsen 1997). One approach is to evaluate 
institutional design on the basis of how it contributes to an institution’s immediate substantive 
result. An evaluation is based on the efficiency of alternative forms of design in specific 
situations. The aim is to secure a tight coupling between structure and performance. The 
political actors search for the organisational tools best suited to serve a given set of goals in an 
efficient way (Goodin 1996: 28). Design is based on what political actors want from an 
institution. The legitimising principle of a certain design is linked to the substantive outcome 
of an institution. 
 The other approach is to assess institutional design on the basis of specific properties 
of the institution (Olsen 1997: 220). Institutional design is seen as the appropriate way of 
coping with certain challenges. The aim is to secure that institutional practices and rules are 
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consistent with basic principles and ideas in a polity. Institutions are designed to encourage 
some types of behaviour and inhibit others. The legitimising principle of a certain design is 
linked to rules and practices that secure specific values such as the rule of law, impartiality 
and neutrality (Olsen 1997: 221). Accordingly, representative institutions are not designed to 
secure a certain outcome, but rather designed to constrain processes in certain ways and allow 
for different substantive outcomes.  
 There are, however, various forms of representation, which requires different types of 
institutional design. With the aim of discussing institutional design and political 
representation of immigrant-origin minorities in contemporary European states, Pitkin’s 
(1967) seminal work is a good starting point. According to Pitkin (1967) political 
representation is the activity of making citizens’ voices, opinions and perspectives present in 
the public policy making process. Her schematic distinction among four forms of political 
representation is useful in recognising various forms of political representation, and what 
kinds of institutional design they are based on. One is formalistic representation, which refers 
to two dimensions of the formal design of the principal-agent relationship. Authorisation 
refers to the means by which the representative obtains her position (e.g. election or 
appointment of representatives). Accountability is the ability of constituents to sanction their 
representatives for failing to act in accordance with their wishes (e.g. vote an elected 
representative out of office or appoint a new representative).  
The remaining three forms of representation refer to how this principal-agent 
relationship works. The second form is symbolic representation, which is the meaning a 
representative has for those being represented. The third form is descriptive representation, 
which refers to the extent to which representatives resemble those being represented. In 
connection with these two forms of political representation, Pitkin (1967: 61) emphasises that 
being something is more important than doing something. What matters is an institutional 
design is that certain persons are present and heard. In contrast, the last form of representation 
emphasises the actions the representatives take on behalf of those represented. This is 
substantive representation. 
Academic debates on political representation have concentrated on the proper design 
of formal procedures for authorisation and accountability in representative institutions within 
the framework of national democracies (Martiniello 2005: 3; Bauböck 2006). This is related 
to the basic norm of democracy that every individual potentially affected by a decision should 
have an equal opportunity to influence the decision (Dahl 1989; Habermas 1992). 
Representative democracies are however, also based on the idea that the elected representative 
6 
 
should reflect the diversity of the population (Verba et al. 1995; Bloemraad & Schönwälder 
2013). This idea raises the question of the extent to which the representatives need to share 
common characteristics with those they represent, such as territory, gender, age and ethnicity 
in order to understand their interests and values. In such descriptive representation it is not 
only the persons as such who are represented, but also some of the interests and values these 
persons have in common due to their common experiences (Mansbridge 1999). Over the last 
two decades there has been an increasing demand to design institutions in relation to 
descriptive representation because it introduces the social perspective and experiences of 
disadvantaged groups into representative institutions (Kymlicka 1995; Mansbridge 1999; 
Mansbridge 2000; Young 2000).  
While these scholars have questioned the philosophical and theoretical reasons for 
descriptive representation, Bloemraad (2013: 654) aims to promote further empirical work on 
immigrant-origin minorities’ political representation. Her normative point of departure is that 
in many European countries immigrant-origin minorities are not represented in parliaments, 
and therefore these countries experience a democratic deficit vis-à-vis their immigrant-origin 
population. Bloemraad (2013) argues that descriptive representation can lead to consequences 
for a minority group’s substantive representation as those elected can work for other members 
of the group and serve as a spokesperson for the group’s concern.  
While Bloemraad’s arguments are related to the representation of ethnic minorities in 
parliaments, this article analyses immigrant-origin minorities’ extra-parliamentary 
participation and representation. This raises questions about how to assess the design of 
institutions in which minorities are represented. Because of the increased complexities in 
contemporary societies, one may argue, as Olsen (2013: 468) does, that the conventional 
emphasis on the electoral channel has to be supplemented by a renewed examination of the 
democratic roles of guardians and citizens. More specifically, Warren and Castiglione (2006) 
argue there is a need to update contemporary understanding of political representation in 
relation to how voluntary associations, ascriptive groups and non-governmental organisations 
are increasingly recognised as important for the preparation and implementation of politics. In 
such extra-parliamentary representation the constituents might lack the ability to sanction 
their representatives for failing to act in accordance with their wishes, and this might 
challenge the principal-agent relationship. It is thus crucial how such extra-parliamentary 
institutions are designed; whether they are designed to secure a certain substantive outcome or 
linked to rules and practices that secure specific values – such as the idea that the elected 
representative should reflect the diversity of the population. 
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The design of CIO’s extra-parliamentary representation is examined within the context 
of the Nordic political tradition. The central characteristics of the voluntary sector in Norway, 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark are such that the organisations have a broad membership base, 
participation in voluntary work is seen as an integral part of being a member of an 
organisation and they are democratically structured (Trägårdh and Vamstad 2009; Wollebæk 
and Sivesind 2010; Bengtsson et al. 2010). Voluntary organisations have democratic 
legitimacy through their members’ representation, while the legitimacy of voluntary 
organisations in many European countries rests on their moral foundation and their ability to 
turn fundamental ideological ideas into practice (Lorentzen 2004). The Nordic tradition also 
stands in contrast to the Anglo-American model of voluntary work, in which individuals are 
often associated with non-profit making organisations as donors and volunteers rather than as 
members (Trägårdh and Vamstad 2009). In line with the Nordic tradition, membership-based 
voluntary organisations are established and run outside the state administration and the private 
sphere, but there are also huge overlapping zones. In Norway, there is a tradition of having 
two legitimate ways to political influence, one through the incorporation of voluntary 
organisations in the state administration (extra-parliamentary) and one through the election 
channel (within the parliamentary system) (Rokkan 1966). This tradition of organising the 
voluntary sector is applied to immigrant organisations, and is reflected in support schemes for 
these organisations (Takle 2012). CIO is designed to represent these membership-based and 
democratically structured immigrant organisations.  
 
CIO’s Double Mandate 
When the City of Oslo established CIO in 1985, it defined as CIO's main task the allocation of 
funding to immigrant organisations in the city. Since 1999 CIO has been designed to work to 
achieve a closer cooperation between immigrant organisations and the local administration. 
CIO no longer allocates funding to the organisations, but has gained a more central role as a 
consultative body for the local administration. The local authorities related these changes to a 
more comprehensive reorganisation of the city’s work towards the immigrant-origin 
minorities due to increased immigration. The authorities wanted closer contact and dialogue 
with the organisations with the aim of including them in its integration policy, and gave CIO a 
role in this policy (City of Oslo 2000). Since 2005, a full time secretary of CIO has been 
located in the Town Hall with the aim of improving this cooperation. This location makes it 
possible for the secretary to follow the city administration’s daily work. The municipality 
designed CIO as a public council in line with the Nordic tradition of voluntary organisations. 
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CIO is partly incorporated in the local administration, and designed to be an instrument in the 
city’s integration policy.  CIO is designed and financed by the local authorities and included 
in the local administration, and simultaneously based on voluntary unpaid work. 
Moreover, the municipality's design on how members are authorised are detailed and 
decisive for CIO’s descriptive representation. As mentioned in the introduction, members of 
CIO are elected as representatives for a defined region, whilst youth and each gender must 
also be represented (EMI 2012a). The requirements of regional, youth and gender 
representation imply the entire assembly is designed to form a microcosm or representative 
sample of the electorate. The representatives’ characteristics are thus seen as more important 
than their skills (Mansbridge 1999: 631). CIO is designed to represent immigrant 
organisations with various ethnic or national backgrounds, composition of members, main 
aims, level of formalisation etc. The main common characteristic for all these organisations is 
that their members have a common experience of having immigrated to Norway or they are 
children of persons who have immigrated. The descriptive representation is seen as more 
important than CIO’s efficiency and substantive results, as it is not obvious that these persons 
have similar values and interests nor that the representatives have the required qualifications. 
In line with the Nordic tradition, only membership-based immigrant organisations in 
Oslo with a democratically elected leadership can participate in the election and thereby 
authorise CIO. The organisations must be registered in public records and have delivered 
statutes and membership lists to the local authorities (EMI 2012a). Of the around 300 
immigrant organisations and networks, the municipality has categorised 164 as local, 
membership-based immigrant organisations with internal democratic structures. The 
remaining organisations are mainly looser network and foundations, and these are not eligible 
to vote. This implies the ten CIO members are authorised by immigrant organisations with 
leaders who are elected by their members. Through this design, CIO receives a mandate from 
the members of the immigrant organisations. In the election in 2008, 504 personal votes were 
given by members of various immigrant organisations (City of Oslo 2008). 
Members of these organisations must either themselves have been born outside the 
Nordic countries, Switzerland, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand or be children of 
people born outside these areas. In contrast, organisations with members from those countries 
mentioned are not represented by CIO, or by any other public institution. It is expected that 
persons coming from mainly Western countries easily integrate in the Norwegian society. 
This means CIO mainly represents immigrant organisations with members who have their 
background from Latin America, Asia and Africa. However, since 2009, organisations with 
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members from European countries, with the exception of the Nordic countries, are included 
among the immigrant organisations due to the increased immigration from Eastern- and 
Central-European countries. Although CIO is not truly representative of all immigrants in 
Oslo, the City of Oslo has designed CIO on the basis of an “us/them” position. 
While the immigrant organisations elect representatives to CIO, the City of Oslo 
appoints the leader. This means the members are accountable to the immigrant organisations, 
while the leader is accountable to the local administration. The leader is responsible for 
ensuring that CIO works as an efficient council within the local administration. The 
immigrant organisations seem to expect the municipality to appoint the leader, as they have 
never expressed any objections. This might reflect the fact that the City of Oslo appoints both 
leaders and members of all other Councils in the city on the basis of their specialist 
competence. These other councils are designed in relation to the view that specialist 
competence is crucial to ensure that these councils work efficiently and produce the desired 
results. Elections and membership-based representation is an exception, which only applies to 
CIO members.  
However, the way the authorities have designed CIO gives it a choice of actions the 
other councils do not have. CIO is both a public, council incorporated entity in the 
administrative institutional structure and an entity which can act on behalf of the immigrant 
organisations. This institutional design is crucial for how CIO has performed its activities. 
 
Representation and Political Influence 
CIO has not explicitly formulated any concrete aims or strategy for its activities in one single 
document. By making systematic analyses of CIO’s statements and activities from 2008 to 
2013 one can find some patterns, which together give an overview over what kind of strategy 
CIO has in practice. These patterns show that CIO mainly works: (i) to change public 
institutions, (ii) to have influence on immigrant-origin minorities' issues, (iii) to encourage 
electoral participation and (iv) to gain influence at the state level. 
 
(i) Change Public Institutions 
Public institutions are important in most minorities’ lives, and a certain level of confidence is 
crucial to facilitate political integration (Norris 2011). Such confidence can be determined by 
these institutions’ handling of major public policy issues in relation to the immigrant 
population, such as accommodation, education and employment (City of Oslo 2012a). With 
the aim of overcoming inequalities CIO has both contacted and cooperated with several public 
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institutions. One of CIO’s main activities has been to contact institutions related to the media, 
kindergartens, elderly care, schools and the education system, police and crime, child welfare, 
the labour market etc. The aim in contacting these institutions is to present proposals related 
to how public services could be adapted to the special needs of minorities. CIO has also 
invited several state and municipal institutions to meetings with the aim of discussing how 
they could cooperate, such as the police, members of parliament and the Norwegian equality 
tribunal. At all these meetings CIO has presented itself as a resource these institutions should 
make use of in their daily work (CIO archives 2008-2013).  
Furthermore, CIO has implemented projects in cooperation with public institutions 
such as the fire and rescue services, hospitals and public health institutions and voluntary 
organisations such as the Red Cross. Through these projects CIO aims to inform its 
cooperation partners of the minorities’ special needs as well as the minority population about 
how to proceed in relation to their challenges. One example is CIO’s cooperation with the 
Norwegian Diabetes Association, and Oslo University hospital. Together they organised 
stands in the streets where persons with an immigrant background could test themselves. At 
an internal meeting (31.06.2011) CIO members summarised these stands as extremely 
successful. They talked about several persons who gave a positive test on diabetes, and 
emphasised how important their campaign was to increase the awareness of the special 
challenges related to this illness among some minority groups.  
CIO mainly works to change the underlying majority way of thinking in the 
established state and municipal institutions, with the aim of adapting them to the minorities’ 
lives and cultures. This priority was, however, hardly reflected in the immigrant 
organisations’ activities. Analysis of the immigrant organisations’ statutes shows that the 
organisations mainly work to maintain cultural traditions from their members’ countries of 
origin and spread knowledge about how to adapt to Norwegian society (EMI 2012b). 
Moreover, the statutes show that only seven of the 133 organisations state they aim to 
influence Norwegian society and politics. These seven organisations have defined aims in 
relation to how they want to influence Norwegian society, and one of them formulates this as 
an aim: 
To make visible the ethnic minorities' situation and the problems that minorities have 
in Norwegian society. To influence laws, policies and decisions, which are of 
particular importance for persons with a background as an immigrant or refugee (EMI 
2012b).  
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This low level of ambitions among the organisations means that CIO had higher ambitions to 
influence the Norwegian public institutions than the organisations it represented. There was a 
broad agreement about this strategy among CIO members. As one member said in an 
interview:  
There are a lot of hobby activities among the immigrant organisations, but CIO works 
for something more. We want political influence, and for this we need qualifications 
(07.05.2012). 
 
The way CIO used its position as an elected representative body might imply that there was a 
representation gap. However, CIO members do not have a bounded mandate. CIO is designed 
to represent immigrant-origin minorities in local government, and not to produce a certain 
substantive outcome. As the authorisation is based on descriptive representation it is the 
persons as such who are represented, and what they might have in common due to their 
immigrant background. Anchored in its electoral mandate from the members of 164 
immigrant organisations, CIO often emphasises that it represents all the 300 registered 
organisations in the city (CIO archives 2008-2013). 
The CIO leader, who is appointed by the City of Oslo, influenced CIO’s aim of 
changing public institutions. These activities were adopted from the Organisation against 
Public Discrimination, and the leader is an activist who has worked with these issues for 
several years. As the CIO leader formulated it:  
CIO is not a cultural association. CIO works for equity in public services. We seek 
genuine political influence with desired results (04.09.2012).  
 
With this statement, the leader emphasised that CIO wanted to see consequences of its efforts 
to change public institutions. These efforts were also compatible with the mandate CIO had 
from the City of Oslo to be a consultative body for the local administration on immigrant 
issues. Public institutions in Norway are obliged to offer all persons equal treatment (City of 
Oslo 2012a). CIO raised the question of how this should be done and by whom. 
 
Influence on Immigrant-Origin Minorities' Issues  
CIO aimed to have influence on issues related to immigrant-origin minorities’ integration. 
CIO’s general approach was that the immigrant-origin minorities must be included in all kinds 
of public institutions if these organisations are to succeed in performing their tasks. As the 
CIO leader formulated it:  
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If we are a part of the problem, we also need to be a part of the solution (04.09.2012).  
 
Studies of minorities’ political integration in Norway find that minorities in general agree 
with democratic principles, and are satisfied with how the democratic process works in 
practice (Tronstad and Rogstad 2012). CIO also had a general trust in the overall performance 
of democratic institutions, but it was more sceptical of the way the City of Oslo’s anti-
discrimination OXLO campaign was implemented in practice. OXLO is a permanent 
awareness-raising campaign that was formulated by the City of Oslo following a racially 
motivated murder in Oslo in 2001 (City of Oslo 2001). Within this framework, the local 
parliament adopted an ethical document in which it took a positive stance towards cultural 
diversity, inclusion and tolerance (City of Oslo 2001). Since 2004, the aim of the project has 
been to integrate these values into the city’s work at all administrative and political levels 
including CIO. 
CIO has raised the question of influence on OXLO at several meetings and in letters to 
the authorities (CIO’s archives 2008-2013). These efforts to raise the question of influence on 
OXLO have been met with arguments from political authorities about how OXLO is an 
integrated part of the municipality’s daily work; and neither an organisation nor a campaign 
(City of Oslo 2011). According to the interview with CIO leader:  
OXLO to me is nothing more than a slogan. The people of Oslo don’t have any 
ownership of OXLO, and it appears to me that OXLO is owned, used and dictated by 
the politicians of the municipality of Oslo (04.09.2012). 
 
This shows CIO had tense relations with the administration. The politicians the leader referred 
to are the politicians in the city administration. CIO wanted more influence on public 
institutions than the municipality facilitated through its mandate. CIO believed the City of 
Oslo only referred to the statements in the OXLO campaign instead of changing the public 
institutions. CIO wanted influence on the OXLO campaign with the aim of using the 
awareness-raising campaign to change public institutions. It argued the opinions included in 
the framework of OXLO should be used to change people’s attitudes; to create openness, 
closeness, tolerance, solidarity and community. CIO presented itself as an administrative 
resource that should be integrated in this because it represents several immigrant 
organisations working at the grass-roots level (CIO archives 2008-2013). These references to 
its descriptive representation did not convince the local authorities to include CIO in its daily 
work with OXLO. 
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CIO’s criticism stands in conflict with local authorities’ requirements that all 
immigrant organisations that apply for funding must adhere to the central values in the OXLO 
campaign, and use OXLO’s logo at their events (EMI 2012a). This requirement for receiving 
funding might be crucial to understand why CIO’s criticism has not been a theme discussed 
among the organisations. Moreover, as Esaiasson and Narud (2013: 4) argue, the 
representative relationship changes after the election-day, and the few elected representatives 
dominate the relationship. An alternative way of understanding this lack of discussion among 
the immigrant organisations is such that they were not engaged in these questions, but rather 
occupied with their own activities. 
 
Encourage Electoral Participation 
Prior to both the national election in 2009 and the local election in 2011, CIO arranged 
campaigns to encourage qualified voters with an immigrant background to use this political 
right. Studies of Norwegian local elections show lower electoral participation among persons 
with backgrounds from Asia, Africa and Latin America than among the majority population, 
and reveal the gap has widened over time (Bergh and Bjørklund 2010). CIO worked to reach 
these persons by touring Oslo’s streets and suburbs with an ‘election bus’. From this bus, CIO 
members played loud music and gave information about the election in different languages 
(Norwegian, English, Somali, French, Spanish, Russian and Italian). All CIO members took 
part in the bus, and their central message was to support democracy by urging persons with a 
minority background to use their vote. CIO members distributed flyers with a front page 
picture of CIO’s election bus in front of the Town Hall, including a poster with the following 
text: 
Immigrants could determine the election in 2011. Use your vote. Immigrants are often 
left behind and are falling behind compared to the rest of the population, when it 
comes to employment, accommodation and income. In order to make changes we must 
participate in considerable numbers and vote. Then the politicians will start listening. 
 
CIO’s use of “we” refers to persons with an immigrant background, and in these flyers the 
term “them” seems to refer to the politicians. As several persons with an immigrant 
background are politicians, and the minorities have different political views and interests, one 
might question how relevant this categorisation is. Also in the election campaign, CIO 
followed up the way the municipality had designed CIO on the basis of this distinction. 
Moreover, in its flyers, CIO presented issues minorities should be aware of and should 
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look for in the political parties’ election programmes, and encouraged them to vote in relation 
to how the political parties handle issues related to minorities’ inclusion in Norwegian 
society. CIO did not give advice on which political party to support. It rather presented a 
political standpoint which reflected an urge for more inclusion of minorities in the Norwegian 
society and/or the need to offer special arrangements for minorities. Regarding safety and 
criminality for example, CIO argued there should be more police with an immigrant 
background because it is important that the police mirror the city’s population. According to 
an interview with a CIO member, the minorities’ expertise is essential for Norwegian policy 
in an increasingly diverse society (07.05.2012). 
Also in relation to how CIO encouraged electoral participation it has a different 
approach than the immigrant organisations. Of the 300 immigrant organisations CIO 
represented, only 16 organisations gained financial support from the City of Oslo to undertake 
projects with the aim of mobilising political participation among members in the run-up to the 
2011 local election. While these organisations worked to increase their members’ knowledge 
of Norwegian society, CIO argued for inclusion of and special arrangements for minorities. 
The CIO leader used the scope of action he had because CIO was designed to represent 
immigrant-origin minorities in political institutions. 
With reference to the outcome of the local election in Autumn 2011, CIO’s leader 
emphasised that it is not sufficient for the formal political representation through the local 
parliament to reflect the multicultural composition of Oslo. He argued that persons of an 
immigrant background are representatives of the political parties, and work for the parties’ 
programmes (04.09.2012). He thereby doubts that those elected will represent the interests 
and values of persons with an immigrant background (see Bloemraad 2013; Schönwälder 
2013). By raising doubts about whether descriptive representation will lead to substantive 
representation in the local parliament, the leader simultaneously emphasised that there was a 
need for CIO to compensate for the immigrant-origin minorities’ lack of political influence. 
 
Influence at the State Level 
CIO worked to influence public institutions and policies not only in the municipality, but also 
at state level and here it urged change in the foundation of the Norwegian political 
community. In October 2011, CIO invited itself to a meeting in the Norwegian parliament 
with the leader of the Conservative party, Erna Solberg (Prime Minister since 2013). Several 
issues were discussed at this meeting, and most CIO members were placed around the table. 
One of the issues CIO raised was that there is a need to change the citizenship law. The CIO 
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members argued that a substantial part of the population was excluded from the democratic 
process, and it would be positive for the whole of Norwegian society if they were included. 
The members meant that in the way Norway regulates access to citizenship, blood is seen as 
more important than the place of birth. This sends, according to CIO, negative signals to the 
younger generation who might feel excluded from the community (CIO’s archieve 2008-
2013). 
Solberg was Minister in charge of preparing the introduction of new restrictions to the 
citizenship law, which came into force in 2007. The political process reveals there is broad 
consensus about a restrictive citizenship law in Norway. The law is based on the principle of 
ethnic descent by birth, and this was not discussed in the political process (NOU 2000:32). A 
central aim of the revision was to make sure that the principle of preventing dual citizenship 
was followed in practice. The political process in parliament shows a widely shared 
perception among most politicians that the right to direct participation in a nation’s polity 
requires loyalty to Norwegian society (Ot.prp.41(2004-2005); Takle 2006). Although the 
criteria for access to formal citizenship status are relevant for all persons with an immigrant 
background, this question was hardly raised in the Norwegian political debate. 
The way CIO confronted top level politicians with its ideas about changing the 
citizenship law was, according to interviews with civil servants from the City administration 
(26.04.2012), not in line with its mandate, as it is designed to work at the local level. At the 
end of the meeting with Solberg, she also asked about whose interests CIO represented. The 
leader answered that they represented the immigrant organisations in Oslo, but that he also 
came as leader of the Organisation against Public Discrimination, which is a national 
organisation. He thereby legitimised CIO’s approach towards state institutions with his double 
role as a local and national representative. However, the way some issues such as the 
citizenship law, was presented at this meeting, all CIO members acted more as a national than 
a local organisation. The leader’s critique of the citizenship law had support from all CIO 
members taking part in the meeting with Solberg. Changes to the citizenship law have not 
been a theme in the local immigrant organisations. As CIO is designed as a descriptive 
representative council, neither the local administration nor the immigrant organisations are in 
a position to dictate a certain substantive outcome.  
 
Redesigning CIO 
CIO’s political position within the local government must be seen against a background where 
minorities are well represented in the local parliament both after the election in 2007 and 
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2011. According to interviews with civil servants from the City administration this formal 
representation has led the political authorities to raise the question of whether there was still a 
need for a Council as a compensatory means for minorities (26.04.2012). In 2010 the City of 
Oslo initiated an evaluation of CIO with the aim of redesigning it. The City of Oslo’s aim 
with the evaluation and redesign was to adapt CIO to the changing circumstances in Oslo. 
A working group was charged with the responsibility of preparing proposals for a new 
institutional design. The city administration and members of CIO were represented in this 
working group. Both CIO and the working group arranged several meetings to discuss several 
proposals for reorganisation. After 18 months work, the various proposals were incorporated 
into a report, which was signed by all parties in September 2011 (Working group report 
2011). The working group proposed to strengthen CIO’s ties to the city administration by 
formalising contact between CIO and the city administration. This formalisation should 
increase contact and consultation between CIO and the city administration through regular 
routines. Such formalisation of routines is in line with recommendations from the European 
Council related to the design of consultative bodies for migrants (Gsir and Martiniello 2004). 
Moreover, a study of migration councils in several European cities concludes that they have 
diverging institutional design, but a crucial challenge for all of them arises from a weak 
relationship between consultative bodies and mainstream political institutions (Guentner and 
Stanton 2013).  
After the election in September 2011, the municipality’s responsibility for CIO was 
transferred to a new vice mayor. In contrast to the working group, the new vice major wanted 
to loosen the formalised contact between CIO and the city administration, and focus CIO's 
activities on the immigrant organisations (City of Oslo 2012b). The core of this disagreement 
about CIO’s design was whether Oslo should have a Council of immigrant organisations that 
works towards the formal state and municipal institutions with the aim of changing them, or a 
Council that works towards the immigrant organisations providing measures for their 
integration into Norwegian society. The vice mayor wanted the latter, and simultaneously 
redesign CIO as an umbrella organisation for the immigrant organisations. With this design, 
CIO would stand outside the mainstream decision-making process, and it would be up to the 
City administration when and how CIO should be involved. This would simultaneously give 
CIO an independent position outside the formal administration. 
At a meeting in the Town Hall with the vice mayor and CIO in April 2012, they could 
not agree and the process of redesigning CIO stopped. The vice mayor's conclusion at the 
meeting was to wait for the election of a new CIO, as new CIO members might be more 
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willing to redesign CIO in line with his ideas. These political attempts to steer CIO show its 
ambiguous position. While the vice mayor wanted an efficient design suited to serving the 
aim of helping the immigrant organisations, CIO was also based on descriptive representation. 
The CIO members characteristics were more important than a substantive outcome. The vice 
mayor cannot decide to redesign CIO as an umbrella organisation without approval from CIO 
members. He may decide to close it down by arguing that CIO does not produce the expected 
results, but this is problematic because CIO also is a representative institution for immigrant-
origin minorities in the city.  
When the City of Oslo arranged the election of representatives to CIO in October 
2012, it announced at the meeting that a new task was to be added to its mandate. The new 
CIO members gained the task of finding out whether the immigrant organisations wanted a 
Council without formalised contact with the city administration, that rather worked towards 
the immigrant organisations. This implies the City of Oslo gave CIO the mandate to re-start 
the reorganisation process. It is questionable whether the new CIO would change its opinion. 
However, when the City of Oslo appointed a new Council leader in Spring 2013, it 
simultaneously emphasised that CIO should be defined as a committee, and not a council, 
within the City administration (City of Oslo 2013). With this rearrangement CIO was 
relegated to a weaker position in the formal structures, but it remained incorporated in the city 
administration. 
 
Conclusion 
This article shows how an ambiguous institutional design can be crucial for an immigrant 
council’s representation, activities and political position. CIO’s double mandate both as a 
representative institution and as a council incorporated in the City’s integration policy gives 
CIO an ambiguous institutional platform for its activities. Ambiguity seems to be common for 
immigrant councils in Europe, although they have diverging institutional design (Guentner 
and Stanton 2013). However, CIO’s institutional design gives it an ambiguous form of 
representation, and thereby a choice of actions. CIO can claim to be a democratic 
representative council as it is designed to be a descriptive representative council of the 
immigrant-origin minorities. Moreover, CIO can legitimately claim to be a local council as it 
is authorised by the City of Oslo, which decides its main tasks and appoints the leader.  
Anchored in the mandate CIO has from the immigrant organisations, it can act on 
behalf of these organisations. CIO’s activities reflect interests and values most immigrant-
origin minorities have in common due to their experience of having an immigrant 
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background. The immigrant organisations and CIO have, nevertheless, diverging approaches 
to the integration process. While most of the immigrant organisations work to maintain their 
members’ cultural traditions and help their members to adapt to Norwegian society, CIO has 
turned around the requirements regarding who must adapt. Instead of helping the immigrant-
origin minorities to become better adapted to the Norwegian society, CIO aims to help 
Norwegian institutions to become better adapted to a multicultural society. This raises the 
question of whether the immigrant organisations perceived CIO as accountable. None of the 
organisations have expressed any objections to CIO’s activities. This can mean that the 
organisations supported CIO’s activities, that they did not care about these activities or they 
did not believe that they could have any influence. Because of CIO’s design as a descriptive 
representative council, the organisations have only one formal possibility to sanction CIO and 
that is to elect new members. 
CIO’s activities are based on the aim of transforming the Norwegian state and 
municipal institutions. The principle of equal treatment of all citizens in public services is 
central to most of CIO’s activities. This approach is adopted from the Organisation against 
Public Discrimination. While the CIO leader plays a crucial role in this choice of approach, it 
has broad support among CIO members. These efforts were also compatible with the 
authorities’ policy as public institutions in Norway are obliged to offer all persons equal 
treatment. CIO raised the question of how this should be done and it wanted more influence 
on public institutions. 
However, CIO’s extra-parliamentary descriptive representation is a vulnerable 
position within the local government, especially in situations where persons with immigrant 
background gain political positions such as in Oslo’s local parliament. With reference to this 
formal representation local authorities have raised the question of whether there was still a 
need for an immigrant council. The authorities have started a process of redesigning CIO. The 
vice mayor wants an umbrella organisation providing measures for immigrant organisations’ 
integration in Norwegian society, and not a Council that is incorporated in public institutions 
and tries to transform them. Also the political attempts to steer CIO show its ambiguous 
position within the local government. The local authorities cannot implement a radical 
redesign without approval from CIO members. They may decide to close CIO down by 
arguing that it does not produce the expected results, but this is problematic as long as CIO 
also is a descriptive representative council. Consequently, the City of Oslo has used its 
possibility of redesigning CIO by giving it a new mandate and appointing a new leader from 
Spring 2013. In contrast, the immigrant organisations have not used their sanction 
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possibilities to vote CIO members out of office, but rather re-elected all four Council 
members (and two as deputies) standing for re-election in October 2012. 
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